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Opening Remarks from Ambassador Luis Gallegos,* Moderator
PANEL III: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE ARTICLE 22 (PETITIONS)
Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I have the honor of being the moderator for this panel on the interpretation and implementation of the Convention against Torture 
Article 22. We have a very distinguished panel with us today.
It is a pleasure to be here and talk about Article 22 interpre-
tations. I will start the ball rolling by saying that it is an honor 
for me to be a moderator of this panel because. Article 22 has 
become a very important piece of the work of the human rights 
system by which individuals can petition against states. I think 
that the availability of such individual petitions is a remarkable 
advance in the human rights field.
Of course, for an individual petition to be admissible, there 
are certain requirements that we will be discussing. But, funda-
mentally, the Committee against Torture has made an enormous 
effort to able to handle the very human aspects of the issues 
that we deal with. As an expert of the Committee, I think that 
the issues reaches home when one individualizes a person and 
is able to identify a specific case where there has been torture, 
inhumane, and degrading treatment.
With that being said, let’s give our speakers the floor. Thank you.
* Luis Gallegos has been the Ambassador from Ecuador to the United 
States and a member of the UN Committee against Torture.
** Barbara Jackman is an immigration attorney at Jackman and 
Associates, Canada.
Remarks of Barbara Jackman**
I will briefly address the complaint system under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment and then I will 
address the difference between torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment and make a case for broadening our under-
standing of that kind of mistreatment.
First of all, states who that have ratified the Convention can 
also, under Article 22, declare that they are prepared to have the 
Committee Against Torture consider complaints submitted to 
it by individuals from within that state who claim to have been 
tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment or who claim that their removal from the state to another 
would put them at a substantial risk of being tortured in the other 
state.1 A person is entitled, although not anonymously, to make 
a complaint to the Committee in such instances. Not all states 
have agreed to the complaint process. The United States has 
not; Canada has. Individual complaints to the Committee from 
persons in Canada have been made, some successfully. One of 
the well-known ones is Kahn v. Canada, where the Committee 
decided Kahn, who feared retaliation from Islamic fundamental-
ists, the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence, and the government 
of Pakistan for his affiliation with the Baltistan movement to 
join Kashmir, should not be removed to Pakistan from Canada.2
Once a person makes a complaint, the Committee must 
decide whether it is able to take jurisdiction. There is no par-
ticular form that the complaint must take — submissions can 
1
Gallegos et al.: Panel III: Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention ag
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010
42
be in letter form or any form the author chooses — however, 
certain information must be included so the Committee can 
decide if it has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and if it has 
merit. The complaint must set out the person’s name, address, 
age, and occupation; the name of the State Party against which 
the complaint is being made; and the reason why the complaint 
is being made. If the person has had assistance in preparing the 
complaint, this should be noted. As well, the person must note 
the provisions on which the complaint of torture or subjection 
to cruel, unusual, or inhuman treatment is based, often Article 
16 or Article 22.3 To substantiate that provisions have been vio-
lated, the author must outline the facts of the case and provide 
documentation. For instance, if there are medical reports detail-
ing the type of treatment the person has been or is receiving, 
they should be provided, even if they are after the fact, which 
they often are since torture does not usually occur with doctors 
present at the time.
There is a requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted 
before a person can make a complaint to an international treaty 
body like the Committee against Torture. The person must have 
already gone through the court system in her own country and 
either exhausted the available remedies or be able to show that 
no effective remedies are available.4 For this purpose, unreason-
ably delayed remedies can be considered to be no remedies at 
all. Because of this “rule,” the complaint must show what steps 
have been taken before the courts of the complainant’s country. 
For instance, in Canada, if the Supreme Court of Canada refuses 
to hear the case, the complainant has exhausted her remedies. 
That order would be included with the complaint to demonstrate 
to the Committee that the requirement to exhaust domestic rem-
edies has been fulfilled.
The easiest means of fulfilling this requirement is gener-
ally to actually exhaust domestic remedies. However, there are 
instances where effective remedies just do not exist in the state. 
One example would be where a person who claims to have been 
tortured complains to the investigating prosecutor, asking for an 
investigation and the laying of charges against the person, and 
the investigating prosecutor does nothing for three or four years. 
If there is no judicial remedy to compel prosecutor to complete 
the investigation and lay charges, then this would likely be 
considered to be an ineffective remedy. The complainant would 
not be required to wait for an answer but could file a complaint 
directly with the Committee, setting out in the complaint why 
the remedy would be ineffective in the home state.
Finally, a complaint to the Committee should indicate 
whether or not the complaint has been made anywhere else. This 
is important because there are numerous treaty bodies, like the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee 
against Torture, where one can make a formal complaint, and 
under the corresponding Convention, such a Committee can 
consider the complaint if the state has made a declaration that 
they will be bound by the competence of that Committee. Once 
a complaint is brought before one such treaty body, an indi-
vidual is precluded from bringing the same claim in another 
treaty body. There are, however, other informal, non-treaty body 
complaint mechanisms which do not preclude a complainant 
from bringing a formal claim before a treaty body. Examples 
of these informal mechanisms include bringing a complaint to 
the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment or to the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention.5 Often those agencies, even if they are 
not formalized ones, can be helpful in bringing to light wrongdo-
ings in a particular state, and will not preclude the person from 
bringing a complaint under the Convention against Torture. 
There is no requirement for a state to agree to permit complaints 
by those within its jurisdiction to these kinds of agencies, so that 
any aggrieved person may initiate a complaint.
An important consideration before filing a complaint is 
to consider the scope and nature of the complaint in order to 
determine the best venue in which to bring it. For instance, 
with a complaint concerning torture or where the person is fac-
ing deportation to a country where they believe they may be 
tortured, and there is not an effective remedy in the state, the 
Committee against Torture may well be the appropriate body 
to approach. But, in other instances where an individual wants 
to complain as well about fair trial rights, for example, the UN 
Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American Commission 
may be more suitable venues, because the complainant is not 
limited to addressing only the issues in regards to torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, but may also raise 
broader issues under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, for instance. From what I understand about the 
Committee against Torture, it is largely focused on the facts of 
a particular complaint. For example, in addressing the question 
of whether Canada should send someone back to her country 
to face torture, if the individual’s attorneys think the facts of 
2
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the case are very strong, they will likely bring the complaint 
before the Committee against Torture. Where the person has not 
been treated fairly in the process and where they face a risk of 
torture, the attorneys would probably make a complaint to the 
UN Human Rights Committee, allowing them to put everything 
under one umbrella.
The Committee’s proceedings are closed. Once the 
Committee has heard from a state, which is given six months 
to reply, it will decide whether the complaint is admissible. In 
addition to the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted 
and that the complaint not have been also filed before another 
treaty body, the Committee must reject any complaint which is 
anonymous, is an abuse of the right of submission, or is incom-
patible the provisions of the Convention. If a complaint is found 
to be admissible, the Committee is then free to decide whether 
a state has breached the Convention against Torture. It will take 
further submissions by the complainant and the state before 
rendering its views.
However, succeeding before the Committee does not neces-
sarily mean the state is going to comply with the Committee’s 
views. There are serious problems of non-compliance with the 
Committee’s rulings. This occurs not only where a state refuses 
to implement the Committee’s final decision on the merits, but 
as well when the person requests interim measures. Often, with 
removal or death penalty cases, for example, the complainant 
may request of an international treaty body such as the Human 
Rights Committee or the Committee against Torture, that it 
grant interim measures — in essence an international injunction. 
So, for example, if the person is being deported to a country 
where she claims to face a substantial of torture, a request can 
be made to the Committee to ask the deporting country not to 
remove the person while that the complaint is being reviewed.
In the UK, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found 
that where someone has made a complaint pursuant to a formal 
treaty before an international or regional treaty body which has 
granted interim measures, and where that state’s constitution 
provides for due process, it would be wrong for the state to 
remove the person until the complaint is decided.6 I took a case 
up to our Supreme Court of Canada on that issue.7 Having lost 
at the first level, there was a split court all the way up to leave in 
the Supreme Court. We did not get leave in that Court, but for 
the first time in Canadian judicial history of which I am aware, 
there was a split panel on the leave refusal: one judge dissented 
being in favor of leave being granted. The majority opinion in 
that case was that, even where there is an international remedy 
and where the treaty body has asked for Canada to comply with 
interim-measures, as a matter of fundamental justice, Canada is 
not required to let the person stay until the complaint is decided 
by the treaty body. It is likely that this question will be taken 
up again if an appropriate case comes up. The one thing I have 
learned in the many years I have practiced is that regardless of a 
court or Committee ruling, you just keep trying and eventually 
someone will see the light. That is how the law advances and 
develops.
I think it is important to use the Committee for a number of 
reasons. One important one is that it creates a body of law that 
can be used in domestic proceedings. In the cases in which I have 
been involved in Canada and which raised fundamental human 
rights, we used decisions, views, and reports of the Committee 
against Torture, the UN Human Rights Committee, and other 
treaty bodies. These documents may be considered soft law 
in a sense, but they influence courts. Using the Committees 
to develop a strong and vibrant body of international law that 
assists in promoting human rights domestically is essential. 
Another reason is that, notwithstanding their unenforceability, 
the views of the Committees can have an impact on state prac-
tice. Even states which regularly commit human rights breaches 
do not like to be called to account internationally.
In addition to outlining the complaints process, I wanted to 
touch upon several areas where there is a need to strengthen 
the practice of the Committee. One relates to the distinction 
between torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. In preparing to speak at this conference, I reviewed 
some of the Committee’s recent decisions. Taking three cases 
recently considered, it was difficult to see clear line between 
what is torture and what is cruel, inhuman, and degrading. In 
the one case, Saadia Ali, where the person was found to have 
been tortured, she was severely mistreated, including that she 
was hit and slapped, had her clothes ripped off, and thought 
she was going to die.8 In the other two cases, Osmani9 and 
Keremedchiev,10 the victims were also severely treated, includ-
ing being beaten — one man had blood in his urine — but 
their treatment was determined by the Committee to be cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment. The Convention against 
Torture defines torture, but does not define cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. One of the best sources for discerning what 
is cruel, inhuman, and degrading and what is torture are the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which has 
a more developed body of law around the issue. It is important 
for the Committee that it advances an understanding of the law 
so that its decisions are not just rooted in the facts but contribute 
to a deeper kind of analysis of the problem.
A pressing issue which arises in our post 9-11 world is 
whether to broaden or expand an understanding of torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment to respond to develop-
ing practices of mistreatment or to limit these concepts to more 
traditional forms of inflicting severe pain and suffering in the 
hopes that a more narrow understanding of the concepts will 
spur state compliance. I do not favor the latter view; I think the 
broader the definitions are, the better, because just as the ways 
of mistreating people are expanding, so must our definitions.
Arising from this is the question of whether the Committee 
and domestic courts are sufficiently aware of the forms of severe 
mistreatment that are being implemented by states. For example, 
in United Kingdom and Canada, people are not beaten, but 
nevertheless are being subjected to severe mistreatment under 
the control order and security certificate systems in these coun-
tries, respectively. In both systems, persons suspected of being 
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terrorists are either detained or subjected to severe controls for 
an indefinite period of time, including lengthy solitary confine-
ment. In the case of Hassan Almrei, he spent more than seven 
years in solitary confinement in Canada for no reason; the court 
ultimately recognized that there were not reasonable grounds 
to believe that he was a member of a terrorist organization.11 
“Reasonable grounds” is defined as something more than a 
possibility, but lower than a balance of probabilities, one of the 
lowest thresholds in Canadian law. Consequently, this means 
that the Canada was unable to prove it was possible that Almrei 
was involved in any way with terrorism, yet he was held years 
in solitary confinement before this was finally determined. The 
individuals subject to indefinite detention and controls in place 
in Canada and the United Kingdom are unable to cope as the 
years pass. I have clients who suffer mentally under security cer-
tificates. The control orders in the United Kingdom are equally 
harmful: approximately five of the people on control orders have 
been in psychiatric institutions. If a person is destroyed, such 
that some may never be released from a psychiatric institution, it 
a CompaRative appRoaCh to petitions at the 
inteR-ameRiCan Commission anD the  
un Committee aGainst toRtuRe
Thank you very much. I would like to thank American University Washington College of Law and Amnesty International for this fantastic opportunity. Last night, 
Dean Grossman said that this kind of space is necessary to cre-
ate an exchange of new ideas between academics, civil society, 
and members of international bodies. Today I will talk about 
Article 22 of the Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment1 from a 
comparative perspective contrasting the Inter-American system 
(IAS) and the United Nations system. The Center for Justice 
and International Law (CEJIL)2 is a regional NGO whose mis-
sion is to achieve full implementation of international standards 
through the use of tools for the protection of human rights avail-
able in the Organization of American States (OAS) and also 
international instruments. Our approach is a victim-centered 
one. This means that we are not going to take any steps that are 
contrary to victims’ interests, even if those steps would allow 
us to create some new jurisprudence. We work in partnership 
with human rights defenders and organizations throughout the 
Americas. As an effort to integrate international standards in 
torture, CEJIL worked in conjunction with the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) to publish a guide3 that will 
help to ensure that international and regional legal norms for 
the prevention of torture and other ill treatment are universally 
respected and implemented. Professor Juan Mendez of the 
Washington College of Law made reference to this instrument 
on an earlier panel.
Remarks of Francisco Quintana*
* Francisco Quintana is the Deputy Program Director for the 
Andean, North American, and Caribbean Region at the Center for 
Justice and International Law.
does not matter that there was no physical injury. This mistreat-
ment is cruel, if not in some instances torture.
It is important to recognize that torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment do not necessarily 
involve hitting someone or, as is becoming typical, using white 
lights or noise; there are other, less obvious forms. States are 
becoming very sophisticated. Canada and the UK, I think, are 
leading the way, and their measures are court approved. It is 
telling that the Supreme Court of Canada did not find that Mr. 
Almrei had suffered torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment when we raised the issue before it.12 It is likely more 
difficult for countries, which do not approve of torture or other 
cruel measures, to accept that they themselves are involved in 
inflicting them on people. This makes it all the more important 
to recognize that treatment is cruel, inhuman, or degrading, if 
not in some instances torture, so that it is stopped now before 
it develops further and becomes standard practice. Thank you.
   HRB
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As a first step, we introduced and promoted standards with-
out focusing on the implementation of Article 22 petitions. The 
literature on this particular mechanism is scarce, and the few 
books that refer to this Article 22 petition system only address 
the requirements that must be established. My presentation will 
compare the different systems to try to decide which organ is 
the best one in which to present a petition. This is a decision 
that we face in our work all the time. Some of the questions 
that we must address are how long the procedure will last; how 
much knowledge the international body has of the region or the 
country at issue; whether the jurisprudence on that particular 
point in the international body is sufficient; and finally which 
kinds of reparations are available in the particular case. As we 
analyze these complex issues, we will refer to Article 22 and 
the correspondent articles of the Inter-American Convention. 
I will focus mostly in Latin America, because that is where 
the IAS has the most impact. As Barbara Jackman mentioned, 
there have been many cases brought against Canada before 
Committee against Torture: 68 of these cases have been reg-
istered. I will not address Canada because this country is not a 
State Party to the American Convention on Human Rights4 or to 
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.5 
Nonetheless, I would like to point out that Canada is the third on 
the list of countries with the most cases before the Committee 
against Torture.
Now, let’s compare the presentation of a petition under 
both systems. Under the UN Convention against Torture, peti-
tions are regulated by Article 22 and clarified by its rules of 
procedure. In contrast, in the IAS the American Convention on 
Human Rights embodies the initial procedure in several articles 
in more detail than the Convention against Torture. Both instru-
ments recognize a broad concept of access to justice. As Barbara 
mentioned, in the Committee against Torture, a petition can 
be presented without any formalities; any person can submit a 
communication. This is also true for the IAS where the protec-
tion is stated in even clearer terms. The American Convention 
expressly mentions that a petition can be presented by any per-
son or any international human rights organization registered in 
the Member States of the OAS.
Article 22(1) of the Convention against Torture requires 
express consent of the State Party through the means of a spe-
cial declaration, which has been subject to reservations, in order 
for individuals to present a petition. In the IAS, all states that 
have ratified the American Convention can automatically pres-
ent to or be subject to the jurisdiction of, the Inter-American 
Commission, as the competence of the organ is incorporated 
in the Treaty. In the case of the Inter-American Court, a dec-
laration similar to the Convention against Torture, Article 22 
is necessary in order to recognize the competence of the tribu-
nal. The admissibility requirements of Article 22, paragraph 5 
establish that domestic remedies have to be exhausted. This is 
true for almost any international body that receives individual 
complaints, but on this issue we can find two main differences 
between the IAS and the UN system. The UN Convention only 
expressly mentions exceptions to this rule when remedies are 
unreasonably prolonged or are unlikely to bring effective relief 
to the victim. By contrast, in the IAS Article 26 gives a much 
broader definition, as well as much broader exceptions to this 
rule. Jurisprudence both from the Inter-American Commission 
and the Inter-American Court have expanded these exceptions 
and clarified the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule. In the 
IAS, when domestic remedies have been fully exhausted the 
case must be presented six months after the final notification of 
a decision that satisfies exhaustion of domestic remedies. In the 
case of the Convention against Torture, there is no express time 
limitation for the presentation of a petition in the case of full 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Barbara also mentioned some additional requirements to 
present a petition: the name, address, and age of the petitioner. 
This is also expressly mentioned in the IAS instruments, but 
there is a difference. The American Convention expressly men-
tions the requirements that a petitioner must fulfill. In the UN 
system, it is not the Convention but rather Rule 99 of the Rules 
of Procedure that clearly states the formal requirements that the 
Secretariat will review. This Rule 99 states that the Secretariat 
will make a follow-up request if the petition fails to comply 
with any requirements. Another requirement for admissibility 
mentioned in both Conventions is that the petition has not been 
presented to another international adjudicatory organ.
A ground for inadmissibility in both bodies is that the 
communication is anonymous. In the IAS, it is also stated in 
Article 46 of the American Convention that failure to comply 
with certain requirements, such as insufficient facts that sup-
port the alleged violation or that a petition that is groundless 
or obviously out of order, could be ground for inadmissibility. 
According to the UN Committee, a ground for inadmissibility is 
that the communication is considered to be an abuse of the right. 
The UN Committee has considered a communication to be in 
this latter category when the submission of a matter amounts to 
malice or a display of bad faith or intent at least to mislead; is 
frivolous; or the acts or omissions referred to must have nothing 
to do with the Convention.
Another aspect that I would like to point out in the procedure 
for torture petitions at the UN level is the fact that there is a 
very long time limit for states to submit a written explanation 
in response to a communication that has been transmitted to 
them. Article 22, paragraph 3 establishes a six-month period for 
the state to present its written observations. On a first look, this 
would seem an excessive period of time because of the nature 
of the crime of torture that is considered by the UN Committee. 
Although in the IAS time limits appear to be shorter, in prac-
tice, almost at every stage of the procedure the Inter-American 
Commission will give two-to-four months for parties to submit 
any written observations requested, but the IAS seems to be 
flexible with minor delays. Nonetheless, in the early stages of 
the procedure, there is a huge backlog in the IAS that effec-
tively delays initial petitions for up to two years before the 
Commission even requests information from the state. Thus, 
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the Convention’s NoNrefoulemeNt oBliGation in 
the Context of the “WaR on teRRoR”
Thanks to Dean Grossman for joining with Amnesty International to host this very timely meeting, and thanks as well to all of the people who organized the event 
logistics.
In terms of my own work in the national security and coun-
terterrorism realm, there are two individual cases that I am going 
to discuss today: Attia v. Sweden1 and Agiza v. Sweden.2 They 
comprise an extremely small but vitally important subset of inter-
national jurisprudence that is crucial to the effort to seek account-
ability for human rights abuses committed in the context of this 
so-called “War on Terror.” The Agiza case in particular, I would 
argue, is a seminal case in terms of that type of accountability.
In the interest of full disclosure, I was deeply involved in 
both cases and worked with counsel in both cases. So when I 
talk about these cases, they are deeply personal to me. But, it also 
means that you are really getting an insider’s view of how some 
of these types of individual communications unfold and how 
advocacy organizations can have an impact.
Just by way of technical information, as Dean Grossman has 
noted, the vast majority of individual petitions to the Committee 
against Torture involve Article 3 of the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, 
which is the nonrefoulement obligation.3 This obligation refers to 
the absolute prohibition of sending someone back to a place via 
a variety of transfers — deportation, rendition, or simple return 
expulsion — where they would be at risk of torture, especially 
Remarks of Julia Hall*
* Julia Hall is a researcher on counter-terrorism and human rights in 
Europe at Amnesty International.
if we take the Commission’s backlog into account, the UN 
Committee’s six-month rule does not seem so long.
As Barbara mentioned, there are some stages of the UN 
Committee procedure that are more clearly defined in the IAS. 
The IAS has the admissibility stage, the merits stage, and also 
some follow-up to ensure compliance. Another very effective 
feature at the IAS is the friendly settlement procedure,6 which is 
not present in the UN Committee procedure.
I also want to mention the impact of the UN Committee in 
Latin America. At present, only twelve states in Latin America 
have presented Article 22 declarations allowing individuals to 
present petitions against them to the Committee against Torture. 
The OAS encompasses 34 Member States, thus the UNCAT 
covers only 35 percent of countries in Latin America.
According to the most recent survey on the status of com-
munications done by the UN Committee against Torture in 
November 2009,7 a summary of the presentation of petitions in 
Latin America is as follows: only four cases have been reported 
against Argentina; one against Argentina; and one against 
Venezuela, for a total of six cases. In the rest of the coun-
tries, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, the number of petitions is zero. 
We have to point out that some of these countries have only 
accepted the competence of the Committee a couple of years 
ago. This official information presented just three months ago 
leads us to ask the question: Why should we in Latin America 
go to the UN Committee on Torture when we have an Inter-
American system that has proven to be effective? Some answers 
to that question have been debated today and I will just mention 
one: the cases and the problems that are faced at the interna-
tional level are different from the ones faced at the regional 
level, so there can be good complementarity when working with 
both systems.
However, in conclusion, I can say that when representing 
victims in the Inter-American region, we recommend going first 
to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. Thank you 
very much.  HRB
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where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. It is important to 
look at this issue in light of the Committee’s General Comment 
No. 2,4 the newest of the general comments, which was adopted 
in 2007. We can add to that discussion in a more authoritative 
way, per Barbara Jackman’s comments, that the absolute pro-
hibition extends to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. Of 
course, that is a very evidence-based test.
It is important to go back to General Comment No. 1 by way 
of background.5 Unfortunately, this Comment is woefully out-
dated and remains extremely vague, but we have not heard these 
words yet today, so let me say them. Based on this Comment, 
the authors of a petition have to prove certain things. They have 
to prove that the risk of torture upon the individual’s return to a 
state is not merely theoretical, or that they merely suspect that the 
person could be tortured. But, they do not have to prove that it is 
highly probable that the person will be tortured. There is a lot of 
room in between those two things. So, in terms of evidence and 
standards, this is a very subjective process. In some cases that is 
really helpful, but in other cases it is not. I would argue in the 
Agiza case, it was in fact helpful.
Relevant information can be submitted by both the petitioner 
and the State Party. I would say that up until the very recent past, 
there has been an inequality of arms in terms of the provision of 
information. I think that the Committee has tended to rely more 
on the information from the State Party. But I also think that is 
changing. The forms of evidence that can be submitted include 
a pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights, 
the past torture of a person, medical evidence of that past torture 
or ill treatment, changes on the ground since the person had been 
mistreated that indicate at this point the person would be safer 
elsewhere, and evidence as to the credibility of a person. Now, 
when you work in the national security and terrorism realm, cred-
ibility becomes quite an issue. We do not understand yet, or at 
least I do not understand yet, what types of factors the Committee 
against Torture looks at when it comes to credibility. And greater 
clarity in terms of what impacts the credibility of an author would 
be very useful for us.
Now it is no secret that in terms of nonrefoulement, this obli-
gation has taken quite a hit in the years comprising the global 
“War on Terror.” As noted in previous presentations, persons 
have been unlawfully transferred from one country to another 
in the context of the U.S.-led rendition program and national 
security suspects in Europe, Asia, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, have been transferred to places where they 
have been at risk of torture. But, the undermining of nonrefoule-
ment obligations really cannot be pinned on only one country; it 
has truly been a global hit job.
However, in terms of Committee’s rule in mediating this most 
recent damage to the principle, let’s just say that since 9/11, there 
has been a pair of cases that do deal with what the media calls 
“extraordinary rendition,” or what Amnesty International calls 
“unlawful rendition,” which was the subject of these two criti-
cally important individual petitions.
The two cases, Attia v. Sweden and Agiza v. Sweden, deal 
with the expulsion of two Egyptian individuals seeking asylum 
from Sweden to Egypt in the context of this rendition program 
led by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In order to 
understand the immense value of these cases, you must read 
them together. They cannot be read separately if you want to 
actually pull the full value out of them. I would argue that the 
second case, Agiza v. Sweden, is a correction to the first case and 
that this correction contains a damning critique of rendition and 
of the type of complex webs of transfers that we saw during the 
Bush years.
So maybe it is best to begin with the story. What is the story 
of these victims of torture? On December 18, 2001, Ahmed 
Agiza was at a bus stop and Mohammad al-Zari was at school. 
They were apprehended in those separate locations by Swedish 
law enforcement officers. They were bundled into cars and were 
mistreated in transit to Stockholm-Bromma airport.6 When they 
arrived at Bromma Airport, their clothes were cut off. Jumpsuits 
were put on them. They were hooded and blindfolded. They 
claim that suppositories were inserted into their rectums. They 
were bundled onto a plane in the presence of U.S. security and 
intelligence agents who actually conducted the security check 
in Sweden. At that point they were then transferred to Egypt, 
where both men claim that they were tortured.7 The men had no 
recourse to a court or any proceeding allowing them to challenge 
their expulsions. Swedish law at the time permitted summary 
expulsions in national security cases. And here is the rub; here is 
how Sweden justified these transfers on human rights grounds: 
Sweden claims that they had gotten something called “diplomatic 
assurances” from the authorities in Cairo. These diplomatic 
assurances guaranteed that the men would not be tortured or ill-
treated upon return, that they would not be subject to the death 
penalty, and they would have access to fair trials.8 In Agiza’s 
case it would be a retrial, as he had been tried in absentia before.9
For those of you unfamiliar with diplomatic assurances — 
and I am not sure that there are many of you anymore because 
it is become something of a cottage industry in universities to 
research and analyze diplomatic assurances — these promises 
have been criticized up and down by not only by advocacy orga-
nizations like Human Rights Watch, like Amnesty International, 
like the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), who have actu-
ally joined a global coalition against their use, but also in fact 
by many other organs of the United Nations: by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, and by the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detentions. So there is broad criticism. And 
what does the criticism entail? If an official in Cairo said, “We’re 
not going to torture this guy,” why can’t you believe that? The 
damage to the standard comes from the fact that torture is rou-
tine in Egypt, and the Egyptian authorities routinely deny that 
torture occurs. That idea that you would trust the authorities in 
Cairo to keep these two men safe when in fact torture is endemic 
throughout their system is really incredible, in the most generic 
sense of the word.
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But our critique goes beyond that — it goes really into the 
dynamics of torture. What is torture about? Some of the speakers 
have said that governments that practice torture deny it all the 
time. It is practiced in secret. In many countries, even medical 
personnel are involved in the torture and ill-treatment of detain-
ees. It leads to problems with detection, as detainees are afraid 
to talk about the abuse that they suffered because they are afraid 
of reprisals. So, I think built into the dynamics of torture is the 
critique of why actually these assurances, as Louise Arbour said 
so eloquently, cannot work and should not be used.
In addition, and I think it is critical in terms of the Committee 
against Torture cases that I will talk a little bit more about, there 
is absolutely no incentive on the part of either the sending gov-
ernment or the receiving government to acknowledge that there 
has been a breach of the assurances. The sending government 
would have to make an admission against its own interest that 
it had sent someone back to a place where the risk of torture 
had been recognized. The receiving government would have to 
acknowledge to some extent that they had been responsible for 
an act of torture. So again, built into the very process that we 
are talking about is the disincentive for accountability. I would 
like to note as well that the über context for this issue is a 2005 
speech by Condoleezza Rice, where she acknowledged on the 
eve of a trip to Europe that the United States government did in 
fact render people in this complex web of transfers, but that the 
safeguard was that in every case where there was a risk of tor-
ture, the government got diplomatic assurances. So it is quite the 
global lock in terms of justifying these transfers.
I would like to quickly talk about the individual cases. The 
first case, Attia v. Sweden, involves Hanan Attia and her five 
children. Hanan Attia is Ahmed Agiza’s wife. When Agiza was 
transferred, she went into hiding.10 Swedish human rights groups 
helped her go into hiding until she could lodge a petition with the 
Committee against Torture. She did that on December 28, 2001, 
ten days after her husband’s transfer. On January 14, 2002, the 
Committee asked the Swedish government not to expel her until 
they had been able to review her case. Hanan Attia argued that, 
as the wife of a terrorism suspect who had been previously been 
tortured in Egypt, she herself would be subject to intimidation, 
harassment, ill treatment, and possibly torture.11 It is not beyond 
the pale that the Egyptian authorities do threaten, intimidate, 
and torture family members.12 It is an unfortunate feature of the 
jurisprudence of the Committee that, at this point, a family link is 
considered too tenuous. So, Hanan lost on that mark. Her second 
argument was that diplomatic assurances from the Egyptian gov-
ernment were unreliable, and that in fact she had evidence that 
the Egyptian government could not be trusted to comply with the 
assurances.13 As the case proceeded, she presented evidence that 
she thought was compelling, such as the fact that her husband 
had in been tortured and ill treated upon his arrival in Cairo.14 
Based in large measure on information provided by the Swedish 
government to the Committee, they ruled against Hanan Attia. 
The ruling was first based on the tenuous nature of Hanan’s claim 
as her argument was founded in relationship to her husband, and 
they made the argument that she did not personally have per-
sonal and present danger. But secondarily, and more importantly 
for our purposes today, the Committee endorsed the notion that 
the Egyptians were complying with the assurances that they 
had given.15 I want to emphasize that they endorsed that notion 
based largely on information from Sweden, which had conducted 
a series of monitoring visits to Ahmed Agiza in his prison in 
Cairo. So the Committee said, “In light of the passage of time, the 
Committee is also satisfied by the provision of guarantees against 
abusive treatment which also extends to the complainant, and are 
in the present time regularly monitored by the State party.”16 To 
paraphrase, the Committee said, “We think the assurances are 
being observed and we think that those assurances extend to you, 
and so we are going to rule against you.”
In the meantime, Ahmed Agiza’s counsel lodges a peti-
tion with the Committee in 2003. His petition is before the 
Committee, and Hanan Attia’s petition has been denied. Then I 
get a phone call in the spring of 2004 from a Swedish journalist 
who says, “I have a secret report from the Swedish government, 
do you want to see it?” It was all very “cloak and dagger,” and it 
was in fact cloak and dagger. So, they sent me a report. It was the 
first monitoring report that Swedish officials had written up after 
visiting Ahmed Agiza in prison five weeks after he was trans-
ferred. I got two copies, a redacted copy that was largely blacked 
out, and a leaked copy which was the full text of the monitoring 
report. In that report, Ahmed Agiza told the Swedish monitor 
that he had been tortured and ill treated, that he had been beaten, 
that he had been subjected to electric shock, that he had been 
harassed, that he had been placed in a very small cell, that he had 
been deprived of sleep — there was a range of claims in terms of 
his ill-treatment. So this was information that the Swedish gov-
ernment had not shared with the Committee in its deliberations of 
Hanan Attia’s case; those deliberations took place between 2001 
and 2003, and the report was from 2002.Thus, they had failed to 
share that information with the Committee.17
When Ahmed Agiza’s claim came before the Committee, 
it was the first time anywhere in the world that extraordinary 
rendition was under a microscope. Nobody had looked at this 
before Agiza’s claim. There was not one accountability pro-
cess. I want to congratulate both the Committee and the High 
Commissioner’s Office for taking this as case seriously as they 
did. It is a 36-page decision, and I think it is the longest deci-
sion that the Committee has ever written. And at the end of the 
day, the Committee determined that Sweden had violated the 
prohibition against sending someone back to a country where 
there was a risk of torture.18 But, what is interesting about that 
assertion is that anyone who would have looked at this case on 
its face would have determined the same thing: sending a person 
who is suspected of terrorist offenses back to Egypt, at that time, 
would have put him at risk. The richness of the case comes in the 
Committee’s analysis of the interests of three separate security 
agencies — the Egyptian, the Swedish, and the American — col-
luding to send Agiza back to a place where he would be tortured. 
Not only that, but the Committee also addressed the collusion of 
the Swedish government in terms of covering up of what they 
heard from Agiza while on the ground in Egypt. When I read 
the decision, I sense a certain amount of anger on the part of the 
Committee. There were all sorts of mechanisms that could have 
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been used to ensure that the Swedish government could justify 
the return on human rights grounds and that the intelligence ser-
vices could do the same based on diplomatic assurances.
I think that there are several different ways that we need 
to understand this case. First of all, at the time, it was the U.S. 
government and a few other governments who were engaged 
in using diplomatic assurances, including the UK and Canada. 
In the intervening years, we have seen governments drop like 
dominoes. It is not just the United States and Canada and the 
UK, but Italy and Spain and Denmark, which have entertained 
the possibility of diplomatic assurance, although they have not 
all engaged in the practice. It was also seen in the Netherlands 
and in Italy with returns to Tunisia. This case stands out as one of 
the few — at the risk of sounding too poetic — cautionary tales 
against the practice. You now see in cases all over Europe that 
domestic courts are questioning whether a government can send 
people back; you see Agiza v. Sweden in every last one of these 
cases. Therefore, in my mind, I am sorry that the Committee 
initially ruled against Hanan Attia because it struck me that the 
return on its face deserved more deliberation in terms of Article 3 
violations. I was glad to see Agiza v. Sweden. I think that this case 
stands virtually alone at this point, with the exception of a few 
prosecutions of American intelligence agents in Italy that hap-
pened at the end of last year. It stands alone as an accountability 
mechanism for one of the most horrendous abuses that occurred 
during the “War on Terror,” and that is rendition to torture and 
ill-treatment. Thank you very much.  HRB
Remarks of Ann Jordan*
human tRaffiCkinG: is it toRtuRe?
I would like to start by thanking Dean Grossman, the Washington College of Law, and Amnesty International for hosting this event, and for asking me to participate as 
this opportunity takes me out of my safe zone of working on 
human trafficking and forced labor to think about this issue in 
a somewhat different light. Although the connection between 
human trafficking, forced labor, and torture may not seem obvi-
ous at first, I wish to explore this possible connection and I look 
forward to the responses from the experts who are here today. I 
would like to address the question of who can make a complaint 
to the UN Committee against Torture, that is, who qualifies as 
a victim of torture.
First, I would like to introduce three typical trafficking and 
forced labor scenarios: Ismelda, Monica, and Julio decided to 
go abroad for work. Ismelda planned to work in the house of 
a diplomat, Monica traveled with her new husband, and Julio 
planned to work in construction.
However, once in the diplomat’s home, Ismelda found 
herself in a living hell. She was forced to wake every morn-
ing at 5:00 a.m. and work until midnight. She washed, cooked, 
cleaned, took care of the children, and was not paid. She slept on 
a thin mat in the basement of the house and was never allowed 
out, except when she was sent to get the mail. She learned 
quickly to keep quiet and not complain because, if she did, the 
“missus,” would beat her with a stick and often made her kneel 
on a ruler for a long time as punishment. The family also threat-
ened to throw her out on the street and punish her family back 
home for any infraction. She was only allowed to eat scraps left 
over from the family’s table so she never knew if she was going 
to have enough to eat. She was also not allowed to see a doctor, 
even when she had a visible tumor on her stomach and her teeth 
were decaying. Ismelda finally got away when a neighbor saw 
her at the mailbox and asked about the tumor and helped her 
escape with only the clothes on her back.
Monica fell in love with a man who she did not know was 
from a family of traffickers. After marriage and the birth of 
a child, the family took the baby as ransom and then forced 
Monica into prostitution in the capitol city, where she was 
* Ann Jordan is the Director of the Program on Forced Labor and 
Trafficking at the Washington College of Law Center for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law.
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held captive and raped repeatedly until she lost all hope. Many 
women were in her situation, under the control of “husbands” 
with many wives in forced prostitution, who operated with the 
full knowledge of the entire community and law enforcement 
officials. Once she was “broken in,” Monica was sent to another 
country and circulated among brothels around the country. She 
was forced to live in deplorable conditions, kept away from any 
outsiders, and physically punished — once they broke a bottle 
over her head and threatened to cut her with it. However, the 
fact that her baby was being held by the traffickers kept her very 
compliant, listless, and hopeless. Monica finally escaped when 
the police raided the brothel. However, she still does not have 
her child and it is not safe for her return to home.
Julio paid a smuggler to take him abroad to work on a farm. 
However, once across the border, he and other men were taken 
to an isolated farm where they were forced at gunpoint to work 
long hours with no pay and beaten for infractions, and knew 
their families are being threatened back home. One of the men 
was killed trying to escape.
These are typical stories of trafficking victims all over the 
world. If these victims had been trafficked into the United States, 
they would be offered temporary residence, work permits, and 
support. They would probably obtain permanent residence even-
tually. Their traffickers would be put in prison and they would 
be able to get on with their lives. Unfortunately, most countries 
do not have such legal protections; instead, the most common 
response of governments is simply to deport the victims to their 
home countries. So, they need another source of protection. The 
question I want to open for discussion is whether some victims 
of trafficking could qualify as victims of torture to satisfy the 
nonrefoulement principle under the Convention against Torture.
Torture can be linked to trafficking in at least two ways: In 
the first, state-sponsored torture compels a person to emigrate in 
dangerous conditions and perhaps end up in forced labor. This 
trafficked person would be able to seek asylum. The second 
involves the use by traffickers of violence, threats, and psy-
chological coercion as the process by which they reduce their 
victims to compliance. In this case, the question is whether a 
trafficked person in danger of being deported into back into the 
world of the traffickers can meet the criteria of a victim of tor-
ture. There has been very little written about this question and 
even less discussion among anti-trafficking experts. So, while I 
am not an expert on the Convention, I will attempt to open the 
discussion on this tantalizing possibility.
The first question to be addressed is whether victims of traf-
ficking are also victims of torture. The torture provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1 (Article 7) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3)2 do 
not define torture, but the Convention against Torture defines it 
as “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, that is 
intentionally inflicted on a person.”3
Is there any similarity between pain and suffering of torture 
victims and trafficking victims? The methods used by torturers 
are remarkably similar to those used by traffickers:
As described by a counselor in Australia:
Women [I see] have histories of torture, or sex traf-
ficking, [and] tell me stories that contain similar fea-
tures. They did not know where they were being taken 
and were trapped. Their families had no idea of their 
whereabouts. No one could help them or save them. 
The violence and persecution was unpredictable, and 
this was part of the perpetrator’s power over them. 
Fear of what might happen next was almost worse 
than knowing the violence had started. The use of 
rape, beatings, humiliation, deprivation and witness-
ing the torture of others was disclosed. These women 
presented with headaches. . . . Most had had their 
heads targeted in the violent assaults. . . . Instruments 
of the state such as police and government officials 
were used to harm these women in some cases and 
at best colluded with, or turned a blind eye to, the 
violence.4
It can be argued then that victims of torture and victims of traf-
ficking suffer “severe pain or suffering” that is similar or equal.
The next criterion under the Convention is purpose. The 
ICCPR and the European Convention do not explicitly require a 
purpose for the infliction of severe pain or suffering, while the 
Convention requires a purpose of “obtaining from [the victim] 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of hav-
ing committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.”5
The objective of the torturer and, I argue, the trafficker is: 
to use pain or suffering to punish victims for refusal to comply 
with requests, and to force them into compliance; to create a 
psychological effect upon the victim that results in the total sub-
jugation of the will, and a helplessness to escape; and to break 
them physically and psychologically so that they will eventually 
come to accept as inevitable the outcome that the trafficker or 
torturer wants. It can be argued then that traffickers and torturers 
use the same or similar techniques to achieve the same purpose 
— the total control of the victim — and so trafficking cases may 
be able to satisfy the second criteria.
The difficulty with the “trafficking as torture” argument 
under the Convention against Torture arises in the third element, 
which limits the category of persons who are responsible for 
inflicting the torture. The Convention requires a link between 
the infliction of severe pain or suffering and the state. Both the 
ICCPR and the European Convention are silent as to whether 
the actor must be a state actor or can also be a non-state actor. 
In HLR v France, the European Court stated that non-state 
actors can commit torture in the context of a state’s obligation 
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of nonrefoulement.6 Although in that case there was insufficient 
evidence of torture, the case provides protection to a person in 
Europe who can prove that there is a real risk of being subjected 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by a non-state 
actor.7 Interestingly, the case involved a drug trafficker claim-
ing he would be tortured by the trafficking network back home, 
which the court would have accepted if he had produced suf-
ficient proof of the risk of torture.8 Human trafficking cases are 
very similar and so victims in Europe could benefit from this 
ruling if they can produce strong evidence of the risk of torture 
by the traffickers.
In General Comment No. 20, the Human Rights Committee 
recognized that states have an obligation to protect people 
from torture by non-state actors: “It is the duty of the State 
party to afford everyone protection through legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohib-
ited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their 
official capacity, outside their official capacity, or in a private 
capacity.”9Although this refers to acts within the territory of the 
state, the same reasoning would support the responsibility of 
states, under the ICCPR, to protect people from being returned 
home to face torture at the hands of non-state actors. However, 
under the Convention, the state must be involved. The act must 
be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.”10
I recognize that it is extremely difficult under the Convention 
to find that acts by non-state actors would qualify since the 
Committee against Torture has restricted recognition of such 
actors to “de facto regimes . . . where ‘those factions exercise 
certain prerogatives that are comparable to those normally exer-
cised by legitimate governments.’”11
Although the perpetrators of trafficking can be organized 
criminal gangs that control large numbers of people and may 
even control territory through violence and payments to local 
leaders and operate with impunity for years, as in Tlaxcala, I 
do not believe that the typical trafficking networks or gangs are 
de facto regimes. They are not armed groups seeking political 
power; they are simply armed groups seeking to control a base 
for their criminal activities.
However, is it possible to argue that traffickers operate with 
the consent or acquiescence of public officials? In the major-
ity of trafficking cases, corrupt public officials are involved in 
illegal border crossings, in issuing bogus documents, in protect-
ing safe houses en route, protecting the brothels and factories 
in which trafficked persons are held and even ensuring that 
trafficked persons who escape are returned to their traffickers. 
They are known to engage in violence and rape of victims, and 
generally contribute to an atmosphere of fear and hopelessness 
among victims who know they have no option but to submit to 
the demands of the traffickers. Officials who collaborate with 
traffickers and have knowledge of the tactics being used by the 
traffickers to control, punish, and intimidate victims into obedi-
ence and submission are, I would argue, clearly acquiescing in 
the torture being inflicted by the traffickers. This would impli-
cate the state directly in the torture of the victims and, I believe, 
support a claim under the Convention against Torture.
So I end as I began with a question: Are there any circum-
stances under which a victim of trafficking in the types of sce-
narios I have discussed today could produce sufficient evidence 
of acts by a non-state actor carried out with the consent or 
acquiescence of state officials to satisfy the requirements of the 
Convention against Torture? In other words, is there any means 
by which the Torture Convention can provide succor to victims 
of human trafficking, such as Ismelda, Monica, and Julio, who 
may be deported to a country in which they could be tortured, 
re-trafficked, and even killed by criminal gangs?
I look forward to hearing your expert opinions on this ques-
tion. Thank you.
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Thank you very much for the very interesting participa-tion of every one of the panel members. Undoubtedly, we have covered an enormous quantity of doctrine and 
touched on many issues pertaining to the work of the Committee 
against Torture. I think that each panelist has contributed insight 
into very complicated matters of legal finesse and of human 
importance. Each one of you has touched on issues very dear 
to all of us members of the Committee against Torture, and any 
human being. I think this has been an enormously worthwhile 
experience.
On the issue of trafficking, let me just conclude by a refer-
ence to the Committee’s discussion on one particular country. 
We were talking of the issue of trafficking, which we have tried 
Closing Remarks from the Moderator
to bring into each country report. To my enormous surprise, this 
country reported to us that it has estimated one million people 
who are subject to trafficking. So, we are not talking about two 
or three cases, but rather hundreds of thousands of people. In 
that sense, I would also like to contribute by saying that the 
Committee’s General Comment No. 2 equates cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment to torture. So, I think in the future pro-
cedure, we should look more into that aspect of trafficking, not 
necessarily only under the definition in Article 1.
I would like to thank Dean Grossman and thank all of you 
for having this wonderful event that will contribute to a better 
understanding of this enormous and challenging issue of the 
day. Thank you very much.  HRB
Endnotes begin on page 56.
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